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As capacity for SARS-CoV-2 diagnostics has expanded, both with assay types (nucleic acid 
amplification tests, NAATs, antigen tests, and serology) and specimen collection options 
(nasopharyngeal, NP; oropharyngeal, OP; saliva; mid-turbinate, MT; anterior nares, AN), 
interest in use of routine, serial screening of asymptomatic individuals in a variety of settings has 
expanded. Notably, the use of asymptomatic surveillance in higher education(1) and 
professional(2) and non-professional athletics(3), has become commonplace, but transmission in 
these settings has also been observed and linked to lapses in implementation of basic infection 
prevention practices such as masking and physical distancing.(4-6) Given the considerable 
interest in asymptomatic surveillance in areas outside of healthcare, the question of the utility of 
routine screening among healthcare personnel (HCP) in acute care facilities has been raised. 
In this focused review, we describe the reported risk of acquisition of infection after HCP 
exposures to occultly infected patients, the risk acquisition of infection by patients exposed to 
occultly infected HCP, the prevalence of asymptomatic infection among HCP in settings where 
screening has been implemented. We also assess the potential role or routine surveillance of 
asymptomatic HCP to reduce the risk of nosocomial transmission from HCP-to-HCP and HCP-
to-patient. We report on the early experience of acute care facilities that have offered screening 
of asymptomatic HCP outside of confirmed exposures and conclude with considerations for 
facilities considering offering screening, either “on demand” or as part of routine surveillance. 
Risk of HCP Infection after Exposure to Occultly Infected Patients 
There has been widespread implementation of multiple infection prevention measures in 
healthcare facilities, including universal masking of HCP, patients, and visitors, screening for 
symptoms and exposures and appropriate isolation of patients and visitors, testing of 
symptomatic patients as well as targeted testing of asymptomatic patients (i.e., after known 
exposures, prior to or upon admission to a healthcare facility, and prior to specific high-risk 
procedures) as well as appropriate isolation and use of personal protective equipment (PPE) by 
HCP for patients with suspected or confirmed COVID-19.(7, 8) In this setting, the risk of 
transmission from occultly infected patients appears to be low. This assessment is based on 
several published investigations of exposures to HCP(Table 1), demonstrating association 
between universal masking and decreasing incidence of infection,(9) as well as seroprevalence 
studies that have generally failed to demonstrate an association between caring for patients with 
suspected or known COVID-19 and HCP infections, but have shown relationships between 
household contacts(10) and lack of universal mask use when caring for patients.(11) Several 
healthcare facility clusters of HCP infection, however, have been linked to HCP-to-HCP 
transmission tied to eating, drinking, carpooling, and other social events during which infection 
prevention measures were not adhered to.(12-14) 
Risk of Patient Infection after Exposure to Occultly Infected HCP 
At least one study has systematically approached the risk to exposed patients from occultly 
infected HCP, estimated at 0.4%. Baker et al identifed exposed patients between March-June 
2020.(15) After the study had begun, based on changes in public health guidance, all exposed 
patients were referred for testing regardless of symptom status. During this time 238 exposed 
patients were identified, some with more than one exposure, for a total of 253 exposures by a 
total of 60 HCP. In 87 exposures, neither patient nor HCP were wearing face masks; in 166 
exposures, only the HCP was wearing a face mask. Testing for SARS-CoV-2 by PCR was 
performed in 92/253 exposures, of which two resulted positive; the first exposure included 
unmasked face-to-face interaction for 30 minutes in the outpatient setting, the second patient was 
unmasked for 10 minutes with a masked infected HCP, but this patient was also identified as the 
close contact of a household case, and infection was attributed to the household. 
Prevalence of Asymptomatic Infection Among HCP 
Some academic health centers have offered testing to asymptomatic HCP without known 
exposures (i.e, for indications other than those recommended at this time). We are not aware at 
this time of any such practices that are mandatory, or that require repeated testing. A limited 
review of existing programs and results to date are provided (Table 2). The overall prevalence 
among this population is uniformly low and approximates that of institutes of higher education 
which have implemented routine serial screening—the Massachusetts Department of Public 
Health, which tracks the 7-day weighted average of tests by molecular methods notes recent 
percent positive at 0.3%.(16) 
Potential Benefits of Asymptomatic HCP Screening 
Testing of asymptomatic HCP will identify some infections that will otherwise go undetected 
due to lack of prompts for evaluation. The impact of identifying those cases on nosocomial 
infection is not clear; while asymptomatic individuals do transmit infection, available literature 
suggests that the secondary attack rate from asymptomatic individuals is less than those with 
symptoms,(17) and more importantly, in the healthcare setting when adherence to infection 
prevention protocols are in place, the risk of transmission to patients and other HCP, appears 
low. The effect of identifying occultly infected HCP on reduced transmission in the community 
or household setting is likely higher because of the types of interactions in households, and 
household settings have been shown to have the highest rates of secondary transmission.(18) 
Since HCP infection risk is likely higher in community and household settings than in healthcare 
settings, then identification of asymptomatic HCP may have its greates effect in limiting 
transmission in the household setting. 
Outside of a potential impact on reducing transmission, there may be non-infection prevention 
benefits to offering HCP testing, including HCP satisfaction through ease of access and some 
measure of reassurance. This reassurance of a negative test, however, is short-lived and runs a 
risk of reducing compliance with necessary infection control procedures. 
Potential Downsides of Asymptomatic Screening 
Will HCP who test negative for SARS-CoV-2 modify their behaviors in a way that could 
increase risk of transmission, by engaging in more risky behaviors, such as eating or drinking in 
close proximity with non-household members? While we are not aware of evidence to support 
this change in behavior during the current pandemic, observations of lack of compliance with 
eye protection in our own institutions in settings where inpatients are all tested for SARS-CoV-2 
on admission suggest that HCP are assessing risk of transmission from patients and altering their 
behavior accordingly (i.e., not wearing eye protection when the patient tested negative despite 
the existing policy to wear eye protection universally). 
The risk of false positive results, which have generally been very low in nucleic acid 
amplification tests (NAAT) but higher with some antigen tests, in such a low prevelance 
population must also be considered. Facilities will need to decide in advance if all positive 
results will be considered to be true infection, or if additional assessment of each would be 
required to confirm or refute active infection, taking into account the impact on return-to-work 
status and exposure investigations. We are unaware of data on testing of asymptomatic HCP, 
where positive tests were confirmed as “true” positives by follow-up serologic tests. 
Practical Considerations 
There are very practical considerations to any healthcare facility considering offering 
asymptomatic HCP screening either as voluntary or mandatory programs. 
The considerations include the frequency fo testing, the type of assay, the specimen type, and 
any pooling strategies, all of which will affect the sensitivity of the assay and timing of detection. 
Observed self-collection may be an option depending on the specimen type and may introduce 
efficiencies in testing cohorts of HCP at the same time, with appropriate infection prevention 
protocols in place. Unobserved self-collection should be undertaken with caution given the 
possibility of poor sample collection and false-negative results. In low prevalence populations, 
false positives may be a concern, and facilities may consider protocols to follow up positive 
screening tests with confirmatory or other tests. Facilities may consider whether to offer testing 
to all HCP or specific groups, however, caution is advised when focusing on those HCP deemed 
at “higher risk of infection” due to direct patient care, as the most likely source of infection in all 
HCP is community exposure. Thus focusing on HCP with higher risk of unrecognized 
community exposures may be considered. Some facilities may alternatively undertake 
surveillance among HCP in whom infection would pose a greater risk to patients based on the 
types of interactions or patient populations with whom they interact. This strategy should be 
considered with caution, again, however, as the risk to exposed patients when infection 
prevention measures are in place (i.e., universal masking of HCP, daily symptom monitoring, 
and masking of patients whenever possible), is low. 
In addition to the cost of establishing and maintaining a testing program, the additional resources 
that will be required for contact tracing to identify potential exposures to other HCP or patients 
due to lapses in infection prevention protocols must be considered. These include staffing and 
other support in infection prevention programs and occupational health. The demand for testing 
may exceed budgeted resources. 
Summary 
The low risk of nosocomial transmission from patient-to-HCP and from HCP-to-patient, as well 
as low prevalence of asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection among HCP suggests that current 
infection prevention measures in place are effective. The addition of routine asymptomatic 
surveillance to decrease transmission in healthcare facilities should not be pursued as a primary 
infection prevention strategy, and institutions that consider offering such screening will need to 
consider the many practical implications. With increasing community prevalence across much of 
the United States, reinforcing the known, effective infection prevention strategies is paramount. 
Healthcare is not a bubble and routine screening of asymptomatic HCP will not make it one. 
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AGP for at 
least 10 
minutes < 2 
meters from 
patient. 
0 All HCP isolated for 2 weeks 
during which they had daily 
symptom monitoring, twice daily 
temperature measurements; NP 
swabs processed by PCR on first 
day of home isolation (day 1, 2, 
4, or 5 after last exposure) and on 
day 14.  
0.0% 
days; NP positive 
for SARS-CoV-2 








Contact tracing of 
12 patients with 
travel-related 
COVID-19, 




Not described. 222 0 Active symptom monitoring 
during exposure window; only 
symptomatic exposed individuals 
were tested for SARS-CoV-2 by 
PCR. The number of HCP who 
developed symptoms and were 
tested is not specified. Authors 
note that threshold for testing in 
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days during which 
HCP stratified as 
high, medium and 
low risk per 
CDC; risk 
121 3 Active symptom monitoring 
during the exposure window; 
only symptomatic exposed 















transfer to another 
facility (see Bays 
et al for exposure 
investigation of 
this patient at the 
second hospital) 
stratification 
provided for 43 
who developed 
symptoms and 
were tested: high 
(5), medium (36), 











or gloves) and 
one had medium 
risk exposures 
(close contact for 
2 hours wearing a 

















related to 2 
occultly infected 
patients. Patient 1 
was transferred on 




is described in 
Heinzerling et al) 
to Hospital B. 





















Active symptom monitoring 
during the exposure window; 
only symptomatic exposed HCP 
were tested for SARS-CoV-2 by 
PCR. 
Active symptom monitoring 
during the exposure window; 
symptomatic and a subset of 
asymptomatic exposed HCP 
were tested for SARS-CoV-2 by 
PCR. Of 5 confirmed cases, 4 
were present for intubation 
without adequate PPE, the fifth 
had direct contact for several 
days without PPE and during a 
break in the vent circuit. Two 




Hospital B and 
was on Standard 
Precautions for 14 
days prior to 
suspicion for 
COVID-19 during 
which the patient 
was intubated and 
had bronchoscopy 
performed.  
who had direct patient contact 














two patients and 
report of exposures 








Patient 2 are 
noted in non-
hospitalized 
settings as the 
patient was 
appropriately 
75 0 Active symptom monitoring 
during the exposure window; 
symptomatic exposed individuals 
were tested for SARS-CoV-2 by 
PCR; a subset of asymptomatic 












study of confirmed 
COVID-19 
patients and their 
close contacts; 698 
close contacts 





index case within 
2m without 
appropriate PPE; 
no minimum time 
requirement. 
Appropriate PPE 




698 6 Active symptom monitoring 
during the exposure window; 
symptomatic exposed individuals 
were tested for SARS-CoV-2 by 
PCR; asymptomatic HCP were 
also tested as they were 
considered high-risk population. 
Repeat testing of asymptomatics 
only conducted if symptoms 









Patient admitted to 
hospital and on 
Standard 
Precautions 
through HD 13 at 
which point he 
developed acute 
Close contacts 






43 2 Active symptom monitoring; all 
exposed HCP were offered 
testing for SARS-CoV-2 by 
PCR, regardless of symptoms. 8 
of 44 developed symtpoms and 3 
tested positive. Of 36 




made that he was 
likely infected at 
the time of 
admission. The 
patient was not 
wearing a mask; 
on HD7, a new 
universal masking 
policy went into 




with patient was 
45m (range 10-
720min) 
tested and all negative. Note that 
one HCP who was identified as 
infected was determined to have 
a household exposure and thus 
was removed from denominator 
and numerator for calculation.  
Average 1.2% 
HD: hospital day; NP: nasopharyngeal; PCR: polymerase chain reaction; HCP: healthcare personnel; AGP: aerosol-generating procedure; 
a “
Hospital A” referred to in Heinzerling et al is described in detail in Bays et al, where Hospital B is also described. Data presented for 
Heinzerling include only those from “Hospital A.” Data included from Bays et al pertains to Hospital B contact tracing investigation 
(investigation 1A and 2). 
b
 Close contact defined by CDC at the time: “Examples of close contact with a patient or with infectious material could include spending 
prolonged time within 6 feet of the patient, conducting or being present during an aerosol-generating procedure, or direct contact with the 
patient’s secretions or excretions.” 
c
 Exposures related to patient 2 are included in this table because Patient 1 was described in Burke et al; 75 unique HCP contacts are included 
(Personal communication from R Burke to E Shenoy, 8/19/2020). 
Table 2. Reported Prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 Infection Among Asymptomatic HCP 










Asymptomatic employees, initiated 
as part of a hospital cluster, though 











Asymptomatic employees without 
known exposure are offered 
voluntary testing, free of charge; 
limit one per week. 




National Institutes of 




Asymptomatic testing is voluntary 
but highly encouraged; clinical staff 
are encouraged to test weekly. 
Pooled specimen approach is used. 
38,450 in 
8,578 HCP 









Voluntary testing of asymptomatic 
employees, trainees, and students 
randomly selected. Offered in 







new and returning trainees and 
students, new campus housing 
tenants, child care staff working in 
UCSF’s child care centers, and 
others. 
Yale New Haven 
Health System, 
June-July 2020 
Voluntary testing of asymptomatic 
healthcar workers 
11,000 28 0.25% Details not available (31) 
HCP: healthcare personnel; AN: anterior nares; NP: nasopharyngeal. 
a
 screening was initiated in the setting of a cluster of infections though vast majority of testing was performed in non-exposed HCP. Total 
infections presented are those that were not attributed to the cluster and these 14 were removed from the denominator for calculation of 
proportion positive. 
b
 Data provided to not allow identification of asymptomatic denominator. 
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